If your customers have started asking for a SOC 2 report, the controls are probably the easy part. We found that out preparing TechFabric for a SOC 2 Type II examination in 2027, covering Security, Availability and Confidentiality. Most of what an auditor will test already happens here. Pull requests get reviewed before merge, MFA is on, and access goes when people leave. What the readiness work exposed is how little of that we could show to an outsider, for a stated period, without someone going to look.
That gap, between doing a thing and proving it, is most of the work. The observation window gets fixed when readiness closes; until then the job is turning habits into records.
What SOC 2 actually is, briefly
SOC 2 is an examination by an independent auditor of how a service organisation handles customer data, measured against the Trust Services Criteria. Security is the one everybody includes; it's the common baseline covering things like access control, risk management, incident response and change management. The other four, Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity and Privacy, are chosen based on what you promise customers.
We're including Security, Availability and Confidentiality. We didn't limit it to Security only, and that was deliberate. If we're asking customers to run things with us and trust us with their data, availability and confidentiality are the two they ask about next anyway.
There's also the Type I versus Type II distinction, which matters more than it sounds. A Type I says the controls are designed properly as of a point in time. A Type II says they actually operated, consistently, across a window. We're going for Type II because the point-in-time version answers a question nobody is really asking. Anyone can look tidy on a Tuesday.
Why now
Growth, not a lost deal. We're expanding on two fronts at once: our own product initiatives, and more work with larger enterprise customers. Both of those raise the same question from the other side of the table, and it's less "are you secure" than "who has checked". At a certain size of customer, your own account of your controls stops being the thing that gets evaluated. Someone independent has to have tested them.
That makes SOC 2 a readiness measure for us. Operating at that scale takes controls that exist on paper and in practice, and an outside party who has tested both.
From we do this to we can prove we do this
A lot of the practices SOC 2 asks about already exist in a company like ours. We review code. We use MFA. We remove access when someone leaves. We think about vendors. None of that was news. What the early readiness work keeps surfacing is that having a process, documenting it formally, executing it consistently, and being able to produce evidence of it are four different things, and most teams have the first one and assume they have the rest.
The translation looks roughly like this:
| Good practice | Control | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| We review code | Reviews are required before merge | Pull request history |
| We use MFA | MFA enforced on in-scope systems | System configuration and logs |
| We remove access | Offboarding checklist with access revocation | Access records, tickets |
| We check our vendors | Vendor review process with criteria | Completed vendor reviews |
| We handle incidents | Defined response and escalation path | Incident records |
The left column is a conversation. The right column is a file someone can read a year from now without you in the room. Most of the work is the arrow between them.
In a Type II window the auditor doesn't ask "do we do this". They ask "on the third Thursday of April, when the person who normally does it was on leave, did it still happen, and where would I see that".
None of the gaps found so far are about how the team works. Most are about how much of that work lives in people's heads.
Who is actually doing this
I assumed, before we started, that SOC 2 was an IT project with some paperwork attached. It isn't. It's an operations project that happens to be about security.
At TechFabric the work is owned primarily by Operations and HR, with responsibilities distributed across our different locations. HR surprises people until you think about it for ten seconds. Joiners and leavers, security training, who signed what, when someone's access should have been cut off, all of that sits in HR records, and they're exactly the records an auditor samples. Engineering owns the change and deployment side. Leadership owns risk and the decision about what's in scope. IT owns identity and devices.
The distributed-locations part is its own thing. When your team sits in more than one place, "we have a process" can quietly mean three slightly different processes, and the differences only become visible when someone asks for one consistent record across all of them. Any company that grows faster than its documentation ends up there.
We decided at the start to build the controls into normal operational processes instead of standing up a separate compliance programme that runs alongside the real work. A control that only exists during audit season is a performance, and a Type II window will find that out.
What we scoped first
Consultants from Vanta and Rippling helped us map the requirements and structure the initial scope. Tooling and the audit firm get chosen once that scope is settled.
The first three areas we're working through:
Access management. Who has access to what, whether it's still appropriate, and how that gets reviewed on a schedule rather than when someone remembers. This is first for a reason. Nearly every other criterion leans on it.
Equipment management. Devices, who holds them, how they're configured, what happens when one leaves the building or the company. Unglamorous, and the single easiest place to have a quiet gap between the asset list and reality.
Security policies and controls. The written layer. What we actually commit to, in words, approved, dated, and findable by someone who doesn't know who to ask.
Phased, on purpose. The failure mode I've watched other companies hit is trying to remediate every criterion in parallel, which produces a lot of half-finished policies and no evidence of anything. We'd rather have three areas that genuinely operate than eleven that look addressed in a spreadsheet.
We're between assess and remediate. The audit comes after a full observation window.
What I'd tell someone starting this
Four lessons from the readiness stage.
Start with evidence, not policy. It's tempting to write the policies first because writing is tractable and you can finish it. But the question that decides whether a control is real is "where does the record of this land, automatically, without anyone deciding to save it". Work backwards from that and the policy writes itself. Work forwards from the policy and you'll discover in month nine that nothing was being captured.
Give every control a named owner, a person and not a team. "Operations" does not do access reviews. A specific person does, on a specific cadence, or it doesn't happen.
Assume it's company-wide from day one and bring HR in at the start. Half of the evidence an auditor wants is employment lifecycle records. If HR finds out about SOC 2 in month four, you will be reconstructing offboarding history from memory, which is exactly the thing the standard exists to prevent.
And decide Type I versus Type II before you build anything, because it changes what you build. Type II means the controls have to survive holidays, handovers and a quarter where everyone is busy. Design for that, not for the demo.
The next post comes when the gap assessment has findings and the observation window is fixed. If you're thinking about the governance side of this for data and AI systems specifically, we wrote about that separately in an AI governance framework is four answers you can query.
Frequently asked questions
What should we do before the observation window is fixed?
Check where each record lands without anyone deciding to save it. Until the window is fixed, the job is turning habits into records. Anything that exists only because someone remembers to save it is a gap worth finding now.
Does a control count if it only works when one particular person is around?
A Type II window is built to catch that. The auditor's question is whether the control still happened when the usual person was away, so a control that quietly stops on leave is a finding. We'd name a person as owner and then check that the record still appears when they're out.
What if our locations run the same process in slightly different ways?
Expect it. The differences stay hidden until someone asks for one consistent record across all the locations, so ask for that record early, before you write the policy around it. At TechFabric that work is owned by Operations and HR, with responsibilities spread across our locations.